Knowledge of patients' location information (postal/zip codes) is critical in public health research. However, the inclusion of location information makes it easier to determine the identity of the individuals in the data sets. An efficient way to anonymize location information is through aggregation. In order to aggregate the locations efficiently, the data holder needs to know the locations' adjacency information. A location adjacency matrix is big, and requires constant updates, thus it cannot be stored at the data holder's end. A possible solution would be to have the adjacency matrix stored on a cloud server, the data holder can then query the required adjacency records. However, queries reveal information on patients' locations, thus, we need to privately query the cloud server's database. Existing private information retrieval protocols are inefficient for our context, therefore, in this paper, we present an efficient protocol to privately query the server's database for adjacency information and thus preserving patients' privacy.
Introduction
Knowledge of patients' location information is critical for exercising spatial epidemiology. A common patient residence location indicator is the postal/ZIP code. However, the inclusion of such location information makes it easier to determine the identity of the individuals in the data sets. Specifically, patients living in small geographic areas tend to be more easily re-identifiable because they are more likely to be unique on their demographics 1, 2 . A common way to de-identify location information in health data is to stipulate a minimum population size for geographic areas, known as population size cut-off. The larger the population in the area, the less likely that an individual living there would be unique, and hence, the less likely that individual would be identifiable 3, 4 . For example, the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule defines a small geographic area as one having a population smaller than 20,000. Similarly, statistics Canada defines a small geographic area as one having a population smaller than 7,000. However, these rules do not take into consideration the nature or the number of variables in the health data under consideration (such as gender, age and education). In 2010, El Emam et al developed statistical models for all regions of Canada using census data to determine when an area becomes sufficiently large that the risk of re-identification is negligible (i.e., empirically estimate population size cut-offs) 5 . This approach takes into consideration all information (variables) available about the individuals concerned when calculating the size cut-offs 5 . Population size cut-off rules can be implemented using aggregation and suppression [6] [7] [8] . Aggregation combines adjacent postal codes in order to form a larger population area while minimizing an objective function (or constraint). The function is usually problem dependant and is implemented to minimize certain features of the population. The minimal population size for every region (cut-off) is one such constraint. Other desirable constraints include compactness and contiguity. All records in areas that are still too small after aggregation are suppressed. The problem is known as constraint-based clustering. Several constraint-based clustering algorithms exist in the literature [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] In order to aggregate the zip/postal codes efficiently, the data holder needs to know the codes' adjacency information. However, the zip/postal codes adjacency matrix is big and requires constant updates, thus it cannot be stored at the data holder's end. A possible solution would be to have the adjacency matrix stored on a remote cloud server. The cloud would be responsible for maintaining/updating the database. The data holder can then query the needed adjacency records. However, queries reveal information on patients' locations, hence the need to privately retrieve the required records. Existing private information retrieval protocols are inefficient and thus unusable in large problems, thus the motivation to come up with an efficient and private protocol for privately querying a public database.
In this paper, we assume that the data to be aggregated consists of postal codes belonging to one Canadian region with postal codes. The cut-off size for is assumed to be known (note that if the data belongs to more than one region then the larger cut-off could be used). Moreover, we assume that the client has a storage capacity of , this assumption is common in the domain of data outsourcing as discussed in the next section.
Background
Retrieving public information from a remote server while protecting access privacy is a well-studied problem. Several cryptographic protocols have been designed for this purpose. These can be divided into two categories: Private information retrieval protocols (PIR) 13, 14 , and hybrid approaches that employ PIR protocols on a selected subset of the database 15 . The main parameters of interest in these protocols are: the communication complexity between the database holder and the user, as well as the computation complexity for the database holder.
PIR
PIR provides protocols for querying a database while completely hiding the identity of the retrieved records from the database owners. PIR protocols model the problem as a database of bits (in our case, , where the user wants to retrieve the bit with index , in other words, the index of the desired bit is assumed to be known to the user. PIR protocols can be divided into computational PIR and information theoretic PIR.
Information theoretic PIR guarantee that the database holder obtains no information about the users' queries. The database is replicated in non-communicating servers. The user queries each server and computes from the outputs of all servers. The most efficient two server PIR has a communication complexity of ) and a computational complexity of per bit 16 . Computational PIR (cPIR) schemes provide a weaker privacy guarantee; they ensure that a server can get information about the user query if it can solve a computationally difficult problem. cPIR schemes are attractive because database replication is not required (only one server is needed), and thus they do not risk privacy through the assumption of non-colluding servers. The most efficient cPIR protocol is due to Yi et al 17 . The algorithm uses fully homomorphic encryption 18 to generate a communication complexity of ) per block of data retrieved, where is the total number of blocks in the database, and is the ciphertext size. The computation complexity of the algorithm is per block of data retrieved. As noted, PIR solutions have high computation complexity, and thus are not applicable to real problems 15, 19, 20 .
Practical Hybrid Approaches
In an attempt to reduce the cost of PIR, Wang et al 15 proposed a new approach called bounding box PIR (bbPIR). The new approach unifies -anonymity and cPIR. Given a client query requesting entry i x in the database, the client anonymizes its query by requesting a submatrix (referred to as bounding box) of the public data matrix whose size is determined by the client's privacy requirements. The computation cost in bbPIR depends on the area of the box, which in turn depends on the privacy requirements set by the client.
While this method offers privacy for one query, it cannot solve our problem as it fails to guarantee privacy when several consecutive queries are requested by the client. In fact, queries requesting data from neighbouring cells generate bounding boxes with some intersection, the elements in the intersection might have a probability of being requested higher then the limit set by the user's privacy requirements.
Our protocol is presented in details in the next section, followed by privacy and complexity analysis.
Solution
The client has a database of patients' records. The client wants to de-identify in order to share it with some researcher. has a set of unique postal codes ( is a subset of ). is the adjacency matrix held at the cloud, and is another matrix held at the cloud. It contains a list of all Canadian postal codes along with their population sizes. To perform the aggregation, the client needs the adjacency information from the cloud for some of its location variables. As the client cannot reveal these locations to the cloud, our solution adds noise to each query in the form of dummy (obfuscated) locations:
One Query Solution
Assume that a client needs the adjacency information for one location d . As the client cannot reveal d to the cloud, she randomly picks distinct locations,{ all with sizes less than the cut-off . The client then sends a query requesting adjacency information for all locations:
. The cloud, lacking any side information, would not be able to determine the correct location from the obfuscated ones. The number of obfuscated queries, , is set by the client. This will define a limit on the probability of identifying a requested location by the Cloud.
This scenario applies well to one query. However, if multiple queries are needed by the client (i.e. if the client requires adjacency information on several locations), then we need (i) to make sure that these queries together would not breach privacy, and (ii) to prevent the cloud from tracking the client over time. If the cloud is able to track the client long term, then it can use the client's query history to gain information on commonly requested locations.
Anonymizer
As a solution to the second point above, we assume the existence of an anonymizer. The role of the anonymizer is to make sessions performed by the same client untraceable. it is a server that acts as a shield between the client and the cloud. Before the start of a session, the client requests a session ID from the cloud service through the anonymizer. Once granted, the anonymizer performs the queries on the client's behalf using her session ID, receives the query outputs from the cloud and directs these back to the proper client (using the ID information). A client is given different session IDs for different sessions, thus preventing the cloud from linking sessions to the same client. Such anonymizers are used in the internet domain to prevent identity theft and to protect search histories from public disclosure 21 . We assume that the cloud and the client have public encryption keys and respectively. The locations in the queries requested by the client are encrypted using the cloud's public key, , and the queries' outputs (adjacency information) are encrypted using the client's encryption key, . Thus the anonymizer would have no access to the information exchanged between the two parties, its sole job is to shield the client's identity from the Cloud. The anonymizer is trusted to perform its job correctly.
As discussed, the anonymizer prevents the Cloud from tracking the client over multiple sessions. So, we still need to prevent any privacy disclosures from multiple queries within the same session. This will be evident in the overall solution presented next.
Overall Solution
The client first requests a session ID from the cloud through the anonymizer. The geographical area is indicated in the request. The session ID is granted along with the subset of matrix that contains all locations in along with their population size. Now given all the small locations that require adjacency information (small refers to locations that are smaller than the cutoff):
, the client uses the matrixto randomly choose locations from the set of locations with population sizes below the cut-off . The locations will be used as dummies for location , they are referred to as the obfuscated locations for .
Note that, the construction above, assumes the existence of locations inwith small sizes. If this is not the case, then we consider two possible solutions: 1. Change the value of : given , the number of small locations in all of and given , the value is referred to as the sampling fraction or .
sets a limit on the maximum possible privacy that can be achieved. In fact, prior to the request of any query by the client, for any randomly chosen small location , the probability that belongs to the client's dataset is already . Thus should be chosen , in other words, . Note that, choosing guarantees the existence of small locations in -. 2. Increase the size of : If the client has a preset value of , she can request a bigger area of interest from the start that guarantees the existence of small locations. As the cloud has no information on the client's identity (communication is done through an anonymizer), it would not have any prior information on the area actually serviced by the client. Once all obfuscated sets are chosen, the client defines and stores queries , where . The client is ready now to execute a geographical aggregation algorithm of her choice. Every time the adjacency information for a location is needed, the client sends query to the cloud in encrypted form (using the cloud's public key) through the anonymizer. The cloud decrypts query , retrieves the adjacency information for all locations in : , encrypts it using the client's public key, then sends the result back to the client through the anonymizer. The client in turn decrypts the message, extracts the required information, and discards the rest. Note that, if the client has limited storage capacity and cannot store for all , then the same query might be requested several times. This also depends on the clustering algorithm used. Some clustering algorithms perform their aggregation on the data in one pass 22 , while others require several passes 6, 23 . In the next section, we will analyse the privacy implications from repeated queries.
Privacy Analysis
In this section, we formulate the re-identification risk for an intruder who tries to identify the correct locations requested. The intruder is assumed to be located at the cloud server as all communications between the client and the cloud are encrypted. Thus we assume that the intruder has access to each query and to the number of times it is requested: . The use of an anonymizer guarantees that the cloud has no information on the clients and the province(s)/geographical areas they are interested in, thus the intruder cannot classify a location as obfuscated based on geography alone (or gain information on the probability of a location being obfuscated based on its geography). Moreover, we assume that the intruder cannot determine the particular aggregation algorithm used by the cloud from the queries requested. Note that this assumption is plausible, as many aggregation algorithms exist in the literature, with each algorithm having several variations. Moreover, each such algorithm depends heavily on the population features it is trying to minimize and on the constraints that differ from one execution of the same algorithm to another (compactness, contiguity, cut-off..). Another factor that could affect the output of an algorithm is the order of the input data.
Given a query, , the probability of the intruder identifying the correct location from the obfuscated ones is . Given that query is repeated times, and given a variation in population sizes of the locations in , would the intruder be able to rule out some of the locations in ?
Assume that , and let with and . Then 1. If query is requested many times, would the intruder be able to deduce that is the likely candidate? Or, 2. If query is requested once, would the intruder be able to deduce that is the likely candidate?
The questions are legitimate as a postal code close in size to the cut-off most likely requires aggregation with only one or very few other postal code(s) to achieve the required population size, and thus such postal code need not be requested multiple times. On the other hand, using similar reasoning, if a query is queried once, then it most likely corresponds to a postal code with size close to the cut-off.
However this analysis is faulty given the number of reasons for requesting a query multiple times/ or once. We start by treating the first case, i.e. provide some reasons for requesting a query multiple times Some algorithms define a "constraint" parameter that dictates when an aggregation should happen. Such algorithms require a strong constraint in the first pass and relax the parameter in every subsequent pass. Thus, in our example above, postal code might not be aggregated from the first few passes, as the available postal codes to aggregate it with might not meet the constraint parameter set in the first few passes. Some algorithms allow for navigating postal codes between clusters during all stages of the clustering process. Thus a postal code could be aggregated in one pass and then stripped of its aggregate in the same or subsequent passes.
Given that most postal codes are very small in nature, several aggregations might be needed for any postal code to achieve the required size. Thus could be aggregated with several small postal codes, and could thus be requested several times. Moreover, it is worth noting that the cloud does not possess the exact knowledge of the cut-off value. Similarly, several reasons exist for requesting a query once regardless of its size (although this is rarely the case in clustering algorithms with multiple passes)
The adjacency of the query could be stored at the client (some adjacency records are stored depending on the storage capacity of the client) The postal code in question could be a neighbour of another requested postal code and thus added to it without having to query it another time.
Complexity
The primary metric of interest for our protocol is the total amount of communication between the client and the cloud needed for its execution. In a normal setting (where privacy is not a problem), the client sends the requested location and the cloud responds with its corresponding adjacency matrix, thus totalling bits of communications per query (as the cloud sends bits). In our setting, every time the client requires the adjacency of a location, it sends a query consisting of locations, and receives the adjacency information for all locations, totalling bits of communications per query.
The storage requirements for the client is , any extra space would benefit the client in storing the adjacency records for the locations. The time complexity of the Client's algorithm in the worst case is augmented by (for queries construction) and inflated by (as the user receives adjacency information for locations).
Limitations
We presented an algorithm to privately query a public database for postal codes' adjacency information. The algorithm involves only one server. Its overall computation complexity is linear in while previous private protocols are quadratic in . The protocol assumes that the postal codes to be queried, , are known in advance. This implies that the aggregation is done using the set of postal codes in along with the postal codes adjacent to them. In other words, for any postal code , is aggregated with adjacent postal codes belonging to the set only. The practice of performing geographical aggregation from within the set of postal codes in the database is common and provides better privacy 24 . However, a more general solution that allows aggregation with postal codes from the region is also desired in many cases. In such general solution, the postal codes to be queried can not be known in advance. In fact, if is aggregated with another postal code with , and if does not satisfy the population size requirement, then the client needs to retrieve the adjacency information for and before deciding on the best way to further her aggregation. As future work, we would like to generalize the solution to bypass the limitation above.
